Τριαντάφυλλος Σερμέτης
Η Σιωπή
- Κατηγορία: Παράκαιροι Συλλογισμοί
Με τη σιωπή του νου έχεις τη δυνατότητα να νοείς και να κατανοείς. Όταν φλυαρούν οι σκέψεις ούτε νοείς ούτε κατανοείς. Και όταν φλυαρείς με λόγια ούτε σκέφτεσαι.
Τριαντάφυλλος Σερμέτης
Η Μίμηση
- Κατηγορία: Παράκαιροι Συλλογισμοί
Η μίμηση δίχως συλλογισμό και διαβούλευση είναι η λεγόμενη ακατάληπτη ψυχολογία του όχλου. Σε κρίσεις, όπως πολέμου ή επιδημιών, λειτουργεί το ένστικτο που καταλήγει σε ψυχολογία του όχλου.
Τριαντάφυλλος Σερμέτης
Συνωμοσίες
- Κατηγορία: Παράκαιροι Συλλογισμοί
Πόσο φαντασιόπληκτοι, εμμονικοί και συνωμοσιολόγοι μπορούν να γίνουν οι άνθρωποι, όταν συμβαίνει ένα γεγονός που υπερβαίνει τη νοημοσύνη τους, είναι πραγματικά εκπληκτικό.
Τριαντάφυλλος Σερμέτης
Η Ευτυχία
- Κατηγορία: Παράκαιροι Συλλογισμοί
Κανένας δεν ευτυχεί όταν η πόλη δυστυχεί. Η αίσθηση της συλλογικής κοινότητας και η προσωπική ευθύνη είναι τα κριτήρια σεβασμού και φροντίδας προς τον συνάνθρωπο.
Τριαντάφυλλος Σερμέτης
The Vital Momentum and Morality in Henri Bergson
- Κατηγορία: Άρθρα
Triantafyllos Sermetis
Doctor of Philosophy
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
Introduction
In the history of philosophy, the Vitalism[1] or Theory of Momentum appeared in two meanings: the broader and the more specific. In the broader meaning of Vitalism, life is perceived as a force that exists autonomously in the world. In particular, contrary to the mechanistic conception according to which life is considered as a set of natural phenomena that can be explained by the laws that follow the events of the mineral world according to Vitalism, life cannot be fully explained, at least by these laws.
All the perceptions of life that were formed in the second half of the 19th century, in contrast to analogous theories formulated in earlier times, such as in the Renaissance with Nehemiah Grew[2], in the Middle Ages with Francis Glisson (1599-1677)[3] and Henry More (1614-1687)[4], and even in Antiquity with Pythagoras, Aristotle and Galen[5], were called neo-vitalism. A typical representative of this theory is Henry Bergson, who attempted to re-formulate the theory of energy that derived from unproven reasoning. Bergson's Vitalism is strongly opposed to Darwin's model of evolution and natural selection. Darwinism was not the only mechanistic model as was the case with naturalism, the other great theory of life explanation. Bergson criticizes those who were only concerned with the functional activity of the living being and tends to believe that physics and chemistry provide the opportunity for a full knowledge of biological processes. He takes the view that the evolutionary process is not only an artificial examination of repetitive behaviors that are detached from the whole and cannot be related only to the mechanistic perception of life[6]. Although he criticizes teleology, and especially radical teleology, however, he accepts it to some extent, without fully adopting it[7].
For Bergson there are two types of knowledge, which were developed by a vital impetus during development and then separated by their growth. These are the noesis and the instinct[8]. The various aspects of the mechanistic conception of life are logical constructs of the mind. The function of the noesis is to establish relations between things, which has as its primary reference to the inorganic, the static, and the solid. The mind connects continuous non-moving images to create motion. “Everything that is fluid in reality», remarked Bergson, «escapes the mind for the most part, while that which is life itself completely escapes”[9].
Consequently, we need another means, besides the mind, in order to be able to capture the essence of life itself· and this means, according to Bergson, is the instinct. Instinct is of primary importance. For Bergson it is not just a reflex that does not contain any kind of noesis. It is, by all means, different from the noesis, even if the noesis falls into unconsciousness. The instinct potentially includes the noesis and with the instinctive momentum of life, it can be concretized into ideas. This can only be explained scientifically in a different way, not that of the noesis but of the "sympathy"[10]. While the mind deals with matter mechanically, in relation to cause and effect, the instinct works organically. Thanks to the instinct, which is essentially the process of life itself[11], we are able to perceive life from within and realize that it is an autonomous and spontaneous creative momentum. In the generative power of life, there is a potential consciousness. If this consciousness is activated and developed more broadly, it will deepen itself completely. To the extent that we have awareness of the instinct, we understand the essence of life. I have attempted to outline the concepts existing in Bergson's philosophical system above. To understand the Vital Momentum and the morality element and how they are interrelated, it is necessary to analyze, as far as possible, the four successive steps of his philosophy. Duration, Memory, inside Vision and Vitalism[12] constitute a philosophy of life, relocating epistemologically, at the beginning of the 20th century, whether the mechanistic model explaining the world interprets life or not.
The Vital Momentum
For Bergson, then, the world is the product of an uncontrollable force, the Vital Momentum. Initially, the Vital Momentum was manifested in certain physicochemical compounds and was subsequently separated in three different directions and, thus, three basic types of life were created: plants, insects and vertebrates. The movement transmitted by this energy, as it encounters obstacles from impermeable starting material, is sometimes diverted and sometimes divided. It always finds resistance to matter and that is the constant struggle[13]. "Life is a momentum", Bergson says. The development of the Vital Momentum was the creation of human being. The vital impulse that exists in every type of life in human is manifested in two ways: as noesis and as instinct.
The noesis enable us to divide reality in order to get to know it. In particular, when we try to know an object or an event, the noesis allows us firstly to distinguish it from the rest of the reality, then to immobilize it in some of the phases it goes through and then, after fragmenting it, to distinguish it in its parts. Knowing the parts that make up an object, we know the object itself.
This method of proof, has, according to Bergson, a major disadvantage. By isolating things, dividing them and immobilizing them, we separate them from one of their essential traits: movement, flow. We can conceive motion only by instinct. The instinct is sympathy[14]. Empathy[15] is perceived by Bergson as a vital energy of universal power, which differs in all beings and especially in human beings, being able to reflect on itself and lead us to the secret of the knowledge of life[16]. Our instinct reveals another kind of knowledge, knowledge in all its depth, Insight, and the ability to reflect on its object[17]. Insight is the instinct of self-consciousness. It is neither a feeling nor an inspiration. Insight is the immediate knowledge of consciousness without one or more mediations that the noesis presupposes as reasoning[18]. For Bergson, Insight is a method, and indeed a "precise" method, in order to establish it as a theoretical philosophical faculty in contrast to the scientific precision. The relationships of the Vital Momentum with Duration and Memory would remain indefinable without the aid of the Insight. The Insight method is followed by three rules. The first is about creating problems. It is fundamental, according to Bergson, to control false and true problems. The false problem is one that is ready within a society. The real problem is compounded by a free-willed dynamic idea. The second rule is to discover the true differences in nature. Bergson himself constantly uses dualisms to discover the true nature of the problems. Typical examples of dualisms are the notions of instinct - noesis, memory - matter, continuous - discontinuous, contraction - dilation, etc. Finally, the third rule establishes the meaning of Insight. Insight presupposes Duration· in order to understand real time the noesis conception of Duration is essential[19]. We can better understand the difference between noesis and insight if we consider time. There are two forms of time: Spatial time, which we conceive with the noesis abstractly and which is distorted, and, on the other hand, there is the sheer Duration we conceive with the instinct itself[20]. One direction of time is based on the spatial area passing through multiplicity, quantity, degree difference, discontinuity and order. The other direction of the time of Duration is determined by contraction, merging, qualitative difference in nature, internal organization and internal potential multiplicity[21]. Spatial time is the object of our noesis. With the latter, we divide the time into individual units, years, months, days, hours, etc. The abstract, however, is more interested in the deterioration of organisms. The mathematical calculation of time examines a specific moment. When this specific moment is examined from one point in present up to another one in the future, there is always time missing, no matter how many times this specific moment is divided. Therefore, the outer time measured in this way is a world dying and reborn in a perpetual cycle. As a consequence, by becoming static, time alienates itself from its essence, which is the flow, and becomes a form of space. With such a time, however, it is impossible to depict evolution, the characteristic of life[22]. The evolution of creation and the evolutionary phenomena in general, constantly flowing in a continuous motion and which, according to Bergson, constitute life itself, by no means can they be subjected to mathematical calculation or be measured by equation[23].
The real time, then, is Duration, and especially True Duration[24]. The past and present of a living being are embedded in an organic memory[25]. These two contract in the inner world. The two fundamental characteristics of duration are continuity and heterogeneity[26]. According to this reasoning, Duration is not an experience shaped by external representations but an expanded experience, an experience that includes the conventional experience[27]. This time is not shared but it is a continuous whole, which, depending on our mental mood, sometimes moves faster in joy or slower in anguish. Consequently, we are dealing with a perpetual present, the past being integrated into the present. Therefore, evolution is a continuation of the past and the present that works restrictively, that is, uniting. These fluctuations, which are a key component of real time, of Duration, can be captured not with our noesis but with our Insight in a direct and instinctive way. Duration is Life in its essence and is at first memory, consciousness and freedom. The "at first" potential. Under what conditions does duration become an act of self-consciousness and voluntary self-determination? Bergson answers: The Vital Momentum impulse "passes" successfully only to human. In this sense, human is indeed "the reason for the existence of all mankind"[28].
We have already pointed out that the Vital Momentum is branched out and divided into various forms in the beings of the world. We have also stressed that the external form of time contains multiple points identified by the categories of noesis. Duration, as a memory of the past and the present, is determined by its unity. Therefore, the questions arise: Is human personality one and the same or multiple? Is the energy ultimately one or divided? And, if that is the case, what procedure is followed? After all, what is the vital momentum for Bergson?
If a person claims that their personality is unified, then the parts of their soul, which are composed of feelings, sensations and representations of the exterior "revolt and complain". When they are characterized by multiplicity, then "consciousness revolts". This can be a state of one's self[29]. Therefore, personality can be characterized as multiple unity and a single plurality. The unity of the inner world manifests itself as a plurality of outer matter· and one interferes with the other. This is the inner depth of ourselves[30]. The momentum, revealed as life, is activated by gradual steps, when it comes into contact with matter. To the extent that this momentum is triggered when it penetrates matter, it is separated and branched into a plurality. The activation of the momentum has a potentiality into the multiplicity. Consequently, the actuation involves a movement towards the physical exterior. In other words, time enters matter. Depending on the density of matter, the duration varies and is divided into manifolds. The characteristic of Duration is that it differs only externally, but because of its great power, it can potentially explode inside the living being. This presupposes the unity that focuses on an originating global momentum. When Durability appears in this way as a momentum, then it is life. Therefore, the more this explosive energy is released, the more life there is inside it.
Based on my reasoning, the fundamental tenets of Bergson's philosophy appear to be an interplay of individuality with matter. In addition, one could argue that there is inter-subjectivity interrelated in the field of society. To the extent that momentum is differentiated in its unity and according to its qualitative escalation social morality is transcended, then the subject is opened to “an elsewhere”. On the contrary, when the subject is submitted to a restrictive sociability of hierarchical morality values, the potentiality of triggering the impetus for life is deactivated. Consequently, Bergson's personalized Vital Momentum is directly linked to society and to its morality, either open or closed.
Closed Morality
Bergson contrasts the form of open society with that of closed society. In contrast to a closed society, which is not evolving but it remains static by recycling the same features, without incorporating new ones, open society is dynamic in the sense that, responding to the new conditions, it assimilates new elements next to the old and it eliminates any of its old ingredients that are not compatible with new situations. A key feature that motivates societies is morality, whether closed or open. Social morality is individually determined by closed or open souls.
In particular, according to Bergson, a closed society mimics nature in its organization. This organization that presupposes indestructible rules or laws. In a sense, the laws enacted in a society resemble the laws of nature[31]. For a philosopher, of course, there is a fundamental difference between the laws of nature and the laws of society. In the first case, the law compels whereas in the second it orders. In the first case, one cannot escape but in the second case, one can escape the order[32]. The potential dimension that can be brought about in a closed society between natural and social law is bridged by religion, institutionalizing the injustices resulting from precepts, artificially adding societies to an identity of natural and social law[33]. These laws are terms that take the form of obligation and duty. Habits introduce discipline to individuals, as long as they perceive social identity to be the natural order[34]. When a person turns to himself, he realizes his freedom to satisfy his desires. In such case, he does not think of others. Then, a socially accumulated competitive power that goes against one’s desires appears. Contrary to individual motives, this power draws the individual towards itself in proportion to the laws of nature. Thus, the individual, rather than being liberated, submits to a necessity. The fact that a person is conscious that he or she can act freely, but still does what is necessary, is called obligation[35]. On the basis of the above reasoning, it is concluded that religion, as an institutional expression of a society, aims at imposing obligation to the individuals of a society. In a closed society, the individual, as the cell of that society, submits to a morality obligation, constituting a body with society. A closed morality, whose religion is static, institutional, restricts morality in order to achieve social cohesion. Nature has made certain species evolve in such a way, that individuals who belong in these species cannot exist on their own. They are fragile and require the support of the community. The example of bees, used by Bergson, depict these societies. I can argue that there are bodily needs that must be fulfilled. The power of these needs is the source of closed morality. Due to these needs, the rules of closed morality are rigid. Kant's morality philosophy has its source in these needs. The survival of the community requires strict obedience; it is categorical imperative. Thus, the will is not self-determined but it is identified with the Word of nature. However, although Kant's categorical imperative is supposed to have universal validity, according to Bergson this is not the case[36]. He argues that morality restraint is limited and specific. Closed morality is really about the survival of a society, the society in which the individual acts[37]. It therefore excludes any other society[38]. For Bergson, closed morality is bound for conflict situations. The static religion, the religion of closed morality, is based on what Bergson calls "mythical function"[39]. Mythical function is a specific function of imagination that generates voluntary hallucinations[40]. Mythical function produces the sense of a panoptic presence that follows us and invents the images of gods. These images then ensure strict obedience to closed morality. In other words, they ensure social cohesion.
This attitude is the attitude of a person and a society wrapped up in themselves. The souls here rotate in an individual social circle. When a person defends his personal interest over the social, which is a natural process, a closed society can only be conflictual.
Therefore, the archetype of a closed society is the community of gender or race, in which everything is governed by religion and magical-religious prohibitions. Correspondingly, power and general social life operate on such terms and, as a consequence, individuals cannot take the initiative. Community-society, that is, functions almost like a biological organism, in which individuals play the role of body members. Everything remains uniform, stable and unchanging; there is no individual freedom, no creativity, no possibility for evolution to higher social forms[41].
Open Society
Open is the society in which individuals are entitled, and often obliged, to make personal decisions on all issues. The issue of open society is a huge revolution in the way social life and activity are structured, yet it encounters the reaction of closed societies that exist and are supported by two categories of people, the insecure and the selfish[42].
I had pointed out that the Vital Momentum in human is divided into noesis and instinct. The habits of a social morality are rooted in the instinctive nature of human, whereas intelligence is a tool of choice for laws, as a categorical imperative, which the disciplined individual strictly obeys within the society. This is the "whole of obligation"[43] that is not based solely on noesis, but on a demand of latter as a kind of "potential instinct,"[44] as Bergson typically says. Therefore, sociality can only exist in intelligent beings, but it is not founded on intelligence. Social life begins with the noesis but does not stem from it. We see at this point that there is a gap between the noesis and society. To the extent that there is a factor linking the distance between noesis and society, the case of open society is potentially activated. What mediates, according to Bergson, is emotion, or rather, I would say, creative emotion. He criticizes extreme rationality, which removes emotion from the object and views it as a reflection on a mental representation[45]. The concept of emotion in Bergson has nothing to do with noesis or instinct. It distinguishes two types of emotions that have a common characteristic, thymic. The first kind of emotion is related to the idea of a performance. The representation provokes a post-convulsion in the inner world. This depiction is not clearly distinguished from the noesis. This is what Bergson calls "sub-intelligence emotion"[46]. This emotion is mainly concerned with psychology[47]. The second kind of emotion is not associated with fantasies or with representational functions of the material surface[48]. It precedes and takes priority over time "and for the relation of the one that gives birth to the one that is born"[49]. That is, the emotion itself creates its ideas. That's why Bergson will say that "Creation means emotion"[50]. There is the movement of consciousness and the Memory is activated at duration. This emotion is creative for three reasons: a) Because it expresses the whole creation, b) because it creates itself, and c) because it transmits this creativity to other people. Undoubtedly, this emotion is nothing more than an originating archetypal cosmic energy, which, when activated, frees human from any closed society and makes him a co-creator in the movement of all creation. Undoubtedly, the creative emotion requires gradual steps in every human being as much as creative power permeates matter[51]. When uncontrolled cosmic power is realized and transformed into creative emotions in some souls, these souls are privileged. In fact, the Insight into the noesis is born[52]. In this sense, human penetrates and accesses material that is impenetrable, in the first instance, with open creative wholeness. The great souls, according to Bergson, are the souls of artists and mystics[53]. The mystic through this vital momentum of creativity permeates God Himself, intuitively inventing an expression that belongs to creation. It expresses the whole of creation and, thus, weaves the plan of an open society that passes from one soul to another.
Conclusions
In the first part of the study, when I referred to Duration, Memory[54] and Vital Momentum, there was no obvious connection between the concept of morality and dynamic society in the first place. Duration, therefore, as a continuous inner time defines a qualitative potential multiplicity within the world, from which the cosmic memory integrates as one all degrees of multiplicity within that potentiality. Vital Momentum activates this potential and is expressed as creative emotion of many degrees, up to the line of highest level of creativity that Vital Momentum acquires self-consciousness. Creative emotion is, in my view, the defining element of Bergson's philosophical system. The logical sequence of his philosophical thought, starting from "An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness", going to "Matter and Memory" and then to "Creative evolution" and ending in his work "The Two Sources of Morality and Religion", confirms the escalation of his thinking. It aims to free human beings from social necessities and redirect them to a mystic path, where insight plays the determinant role as a conception of the real. To activate the Insight, it is preceded by the element of emotion, which does not accept the representations, but diffuses itself into beings and things as a force of universal creation. The aim of the philosopher is voluntary freedom perceived as existential freedom. In order to achieve this goal, a necessary prerequisite is to divert it to another 'place', which, according to Bergson, is called "Duration". This conception of time that is not announced is an element of another world that does not only have time but, also, space.
In light of Bergson’s philosophy, the Vital Momentum directs human to another mentality. There is an area where freedom can take place, potentially leading to voluntary self-determination and revolutionary self-consciousness, transcending the abyssal chaos of zero. Considering such a possibility, a static social situation may be completely overthrown.
[1] The Vitalism was a dominant stream of Western European thought in the early 20th century. The most important representatives was Bergson, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer. The reader can look it up in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
[2] Grew N., Cosmologia Sacra, Ed. W. Rogers, S. Smith and B. Walofort, London 1701.
[3] English Anatomist, one of the few in his time who believed in the power of internal energy.
[4] An English theologian and philosopher who opposed Descartes' dualism and claimed that there was a fourth dimension that was in the spirit and he used the strange phrase "essential spissitude [untranslatable]" to describe it.
[5] He believed in a vital force that nourishes the human body
[6]Bergson H., Creative Evolution, pp. 47-48, trans. K. Papagiorgis- G. Prelorentzos, ed. Polis, Athens 2005.
[7]Also see, pp. 50-51.
[8]Also see, p. 136.
[9] Also see, pp. 153-154.
[10]Also see, p. 172.
[11]Also see, p. 163.
[12] Deleuze G., The Bergsonism, p. 25, trans. G. Prelorentzos, ed. Scripta, Athens 2010.
[13] Also, Creative revolution, p. 243.
[14] In the history of philosophy, the concept of sympathy has a different meaning from the psychological meaning of the term, which is one feeling the pain of another. In Philosophy, the universal power permeates the whole world and affects all beings· one body can influence another body at the other end of the world. The term "sympathy" was systematized by the Stoic philosophy. Neo-Platonists have adopted this concept and so did Giordano Bruno in the years to come.
[15] Also see, p. 173.
[16] Also.
[17] Also.
[18] Bergson H., “The Philosophical insight”, trans. K. Papalexandrou, journal Epoptia, issue 1, April 1976, tribute to the question "What is philosophy", pp. 23-32.
[19] Husson L., L’ intellectualisme de Bergson, pp. 6-10, ed. P.U.F, Paris 1947.
[20] Bergson H., An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, p.131, trans. K. Papagiorgis, ed. Kastaniotis, Athens 1998.
[21]Also see, pp. 230-231.
[22] Also see, Creative evolution, p.35.
[23] Also see, p. 33.
[24] Worms F., Bergson ou les deux sens de la nie, p. 64. ed. P.U.F., Paris 2004.
[25] Bergson H., Matiere et memoire, Cammille Riquier, Paris 2008.
[26] Robinet A., Bergson, p. 28, ed. Seghers, Paris 1965.
[27] Also see, p. 29.
[28] Bergson H., Two Sources of Morality And Religion, p. 165, trans. V. Tomanas, ed Nisides, Thessaloniki 2006.
[29] Also see, Creative evolution, p. 246.
[30] Also see, p. 246.
[31] Bergson H., Two Sources Of Morality And Religion, p. 11, trans. V. Tomanas, ed. Nisides, Thessaloniki 2006.
[32] Also see, p. 11.
[33] Also see, pp. 12-13.
[34] Also see, p. 13.
[35] Also see, p. 13.
[36] Kant I., Critique of practical reason, p. 78, trans. K. Androulidakis, Athens 2004.
[37] Kant I., Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of morals, p. 34, trans. G. Tzavaras, Athens 1982.
[38] Also see, p. 116.
[39] See, Two Sources Of Morality And Religion, p. 85.
[40] Also see, p. 86.
[41] Popper K., The Open Society and its Enemies, p. 108, trans. E. Papadaki, Athens 2003.
[42] Also see, p. 31. In this work, Popper criticizes Plato's State, but also Hegel's and Marx's. Popper argues that the emergence of the open society of classical ancient Athens triggered the reaction of the closed (oligarchic) societies of Greek antiquity, led by Sparta. According to Popper, Sparta's policy was based on the following principles, which characterize all closed societies.
- Defending the internal organization of society and avoiding any external influences that could lead to the laxity of the rigid religious community taboos on which it was structured.
- Anti-humanism, that is, protection of the community from all kinds of egalitarian, democratic and other ideologies of individual progress.
- State self-sufficiency, that is, independence from trade and exchange.
- Anti-ecumenism that is, maintaining the difference between our "own" race and all others, as well as avoiding admixture with the subordinate (inferior) tribes.
- Sovereignty and enslavement of neighboring communities, states and peoples.
- Avoiding excessive expansion of the state so as not to lose its unitary character.
Popper concludes that the above-mentioned six principles underlying ancient Sparta's policy are also the principles of the politics of modern "closed" societies of the 20th century, having in mind mainly the so-called "socialist" societies, until the late 80s. "We now know that whenever the post-spartian states, especially the empires (Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, etc.) violated these rules, they were subversively influenced. But even in today's times, we can appreciate that the Soviet "closed society" ultimately failed because it reproduced itself.
[43] See, Two Sources οf Morality And Religion, p. 25.
[44] Also see, p. 155.
[45] Also see, p. 34.
[46] Also see, p. 36.
[47] The first studies of the concept of emotion in the science of psychology, from the late 19th century to the early 20th century, focused on its physical-organic dimension and on the subjective awareness of the subjective changes it produces. The key position in this approach, influenced by James's ideas (but also by Darwin's thinking and the primacy of biology at the time), was that man senses a stimulating stimulus and reacts to it as he experiences physical changes whose consciousness is emotion, namely the body that informs the mind that the subject is moved. In this first psychological approach, emotion is perceived as a "bridge" between body and mind. The body experiences stimuli and human being is moved as he or she represents them in his/her noesis. James W., The Principles of Psychology, ed. Harvard University Press 1981.
[48] Worms F., «James et Bergson: lectures croisees», pp. 54-58, journal Philosophie, 64.
[49] See, Two Sources Of Morality And Religion, p. 37.
[50] Also see, p. 37.
[51] Also see, p. 187.
[52] Also see, p. 168.
[53] Also see, p. 188.
[54] See, Worms F., Introduction à Matière et mémoire de Bergson, ed. P.U.F., Paris 2008.
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